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IN T'1'E SUP REillE COURT
OF

T~

STATE OF UTA-q

SALT LAKE CITY CORP., a
municipal corporation of
t~e State of Uta~,

)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent
vs.
D. WILLIA.ii LAYTON and
'1ELEN LAYTON, his wife,

)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 16128

)

Defendants-Appellants.

)
)

- -- - --- -- - - - - APPELL4.NT 1 S REPLY BRIEF

1.

~ere

a1mitted by
number 5.

t~e

~is

is really no question as to
City on page 3 and 4 of

~e

t~eir

facts
brief, except

is in error as Blocks 2 and 4 of appellant's

property are now and

~ave

always been in Salt Lake County.

(See tax notices)
2.
si.uiple

~ere
.lilll.

is no need for a factual

~earing.

It is a

tter <Df:..'addi tion--1897 plus 5 years equals 1902.

Sectionsil34,ll35, and•l37, Cl-,apter 2, Revised Statutes
of

Uta~

1898 required County Commissioners and supervisors

to keep a record of
t\.,e City failed to

monies~expendej

s~ow

on public roads.

any amount from

t~ese

Since

reocrds spent
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on t"'is portion, or any portion of "Pearl Street'' for that
period of time and appellant found no record ei t'l-. er, tnerefore the City failed to make a prima facia case as to the
public riP;"'t or equity to "Pearl Street".
0.

Defendant-appellants are at a loss to understand

"'ow on t"'e one "'and in point 7 of tl-teir statement o+acts,
t"'e City maintains that because the Sout....,ern portion still
appears on official maps of Salt Lake County, it gives thelll
gooaf i tle to it, yet in anotl-.er case before t'l-. is Cotr t and
ot....,ers, namely Salt Lake City vs. D. Wm.. Layton #222264,
even thoogh the road there is clearly sh own on plat maps
on f'ile in the United States Land Of'fice in Salt LakeCity
tor section 2, & 3, Township l Soutli. Range 2 :Sast SLl3&M,
and tl-ie Congress of the United states passed a statute at
large in 1914 preserving tlie rigl-tts to

~e

road, tre City

in t'-at case denie ,that Layton i,as a rig""t to t""at road,
yet now says t"'ey "'ave a rig"'t to t"'is one.
4.

Respon::lents argument, Point I -- At t,.,e top of

page 8 of respondent's brief, a quote from t""e law ,.,as been
underlined except t"'e following sentence:
~ •• provided, tl-iat a road not used for a period of
five years ceases to be a '"'ig"'wayn.

'!"ie words

or worked were omitted after used.

T,.,is

provides a distinction as to whether private of public rights
are involved.

qowever, once t'"'is road has ceased to be,

it is a dead issue and cannot be broug"'t back to life 75
years later.
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1

5.

Case law clearly illustrates t1-.e conditions w"'ich

made necessary t"'e passage of ti-.e provision found at tt--e
top of page 10.

Appellants contend tnat t"'ey do not apply

w"'en one P3 rty owns all t"'e land in the subdivided section.
6.

T"'e statement found near t"'e bottom of page 10:

"T"'is dedication occurred under the operation otlstatutory law and not the operation of common law prI~ciples
reflected by the statutes relating to hig"'ways as urged
by appellants Layton."

T"iis would surely be governed by the general rules under
C'liapter 25 ( 'R'ietiways) or else be in conflict wi ti., t"'e constitutional provision--"If t"'ere is a general rule, ti.,ere
is no need for a specific one".(Art. VI Sec. 26, Mo. 12)
Neither t"'e public nor any privatefarty i-.as acquired
any rig"'ts to ~e "street" w,.,ic"' would allow ti-.e Court to
interfere with defendant-appellant 1 s peaceful possession
7.

From t,.,e argument set fort"' in Point II wi.,ich uses

the word determinable and cites the case of 'N"'ite v Salt Lake
City, 121 U 134, it is apparent that t,.,ere is a great
difference between t"'e facts in t1-.at case and t"'e one we
are now di. scussing.

In ti-le iV'"'ite case t1-.e street "'ad been

in use for years, the use was for t,.,e publ ic--a water line
under a main street, t"'ere was no question of non-use and
claims being barred by t"'e 5 year provision.

In the present

case no one but ti-le Laytons have usel t"'e street, the
proposed use is a speculative use by a non-contributor,
and as t"'ere is no record of any use·~ t"'e self-executing
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3

provision of Section 1116 Laws of Utai., 1898, is in effect,
Point II ignores t'"'e f'act that t'"'ere were t'"'ree separati
ways set forth in t"-e law for ti..,e vacation of streets in
1902.
8.

Point III tries to circumvent the fact t'"'at t\.ie

5-yea.r non use provision was in full force and effect until
1911 when it was cl'i anged py ~the legislature.
Also, the statement on page 17 which says:
11

It is interesting to note t'"'at eaci.., of t'"'e above
mentioned Utah cases imply the public's interest in
subdivision streets would not be subject to abandonment if they had been a City street".

I

I
T'his holding is clearly against t'"'e constitutional pro.·

'"'ibition of Article VI, Section 26, No. 12 as follows:
"T'°'e Legislature is pro'hibi ted from enacting any

private or special laws in t'"'e following cases:
• • • 12. In~rporating cities, towns or villages;
c'"'anging or a.:nending the charter of any city, town~
village; laying out, opening, vacating or alterin~
town plats hi hwa s streets wards alle s or
pu
c grounds. lemphasis added
9.

On t'"'e top ofpage 21 is found:

"T'"'ey reaped t'"'e benefits of that formal subdivision
platting and likewise, are bound by ti.-e consequences
and provisions selected".
Appellantf.ayton a.re at a loss to know '"'aw on one
hand respondents say on page 21 line 9 that t'"'ey paid no
taxes on the street that wasn't ti.,ere, were taxed as if it
were and now find themselves to be "reaping ~e benefits"
of '"'aving the neighboring non-contributor owner, forcing

4
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t"'e appellants to let them use part of t"1er lend, and having
to defend t"1eir rig"1ts to it in court when t"'ere has been
no public need shown for this small area w"1atsoever.

As

far as t"1e public investment goes, whicn is mentioned in
t""e middle paragraph ofpage 21, t'here sh.ply was none.

I

am ~ t'hat tne ubiquitous "reasonable" man w"1o snould be
so everywhere present in legal forums, would never believe
tnat lots are not taxed at a 'higher rate t'han acreage to
make up for the difference.
10.

Point IV on page 22 at the bottom of the page ha.s

tne following statement:
nin 1902, only a dlai~ would "'ave existed--not a
self-executing vested rignt. After 1911, t""e five
year "non-use" provision was completely e li.Jlina ted
and any unexercised claim was extinguis"'ed, in a
statutory provision similar to establis"'ment of a
Statute of limitations".
Let us go back to 1902 for a moment.

At t"1at tir:l.e,

w"1at rignt or claim would t"'e public "'ave had?

}.Tone--

no use, no monies expended, no need, no reason for puplic
authorities to have pursued tne matter at all.

~ow

now

could t"iese empty claims come back to life 75 years later?
If they were barred then, they would certainly be barred
now.
In Point IV #2, tne last line says:
"Furthermore the developer sold lots and i.aproved·,
the nortn portion
of Pear1~street " •
'r"'a t simnly is not true.

5

'l""e northern portion of the
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street was not improved until after appellants Layton owned
the land.

It was done at the direction of and wit" t"e

agreement of both

~

e appellant and the County Road

authorities in t"ie middle 1950 1 s.

The City was still

more than 10 years in the future.

If ever t"ere was an

applicable place for t'he doctrine of la c'hes it is now
and to be use+gainst t"he respondent.
In Point IV #3.

To make a distinction between County

streets and City streets clearly is in violation of
Article VI, Sec. 26, #12 Constitution of t"e State of Utah,
Point IV #4.

T'-ie respondent once again alleges t"at

appellant ha..s received "all of t"'e benefits t"'at came frow
the subdivision platting itself"
one.

on page 24, yet lists not

Appellant intends to develop the area under one owner-

ship and with only one purpose in mind; t'h at is, to achieve
t"'e greatest good for t"ia whole area and to fully utilize
t"'e railroad on the South, t'he road on the West ( 1045 West)
and 17th South on t 1'-e North.
Point IV

#5.

There is not'IJing stopping the abutting

land owner on the east of appellants property frM developint
his own lot just as all the property owners in '.tuayle Street
have devel9ped their similar lots.
Point IV #6.

This case is here to decide a non-con-

tri butor' s rights to a proposed, by never user(segrnent of
a street.

This street goes now"'ere, as t"'e railroad preventi

its extension to t'he sout'i.

We do not "'"' ve to try all 1;\'e

troubles of the world in t'-is one case.
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6

Point V or. page 27 line 8 (this is

~issouri

not Kansas),

there is an adnission shown below by t'-e respondent that
appellants are right, and COilll!lOn sense, if there be a :il.stincti on between i ~and common law, would have prevented t'iis
Jlatter from

achievi~

its present form and size.

There was and is no common chain of title with the
dedicator.
The statement by the respondent City on line 21 of
page 27:
''In a case w,.,ere a butting property owners do not s1iare
a common ci.,ain of title with the dedicator, then
non-contributors gain nothing from t'lie vacation".
The balance of the above stateine nt

<D

ncerns private

rights w'liich as stated on page 28:
"This !I'S. tter is not in controversy an:i t'"e Court
'lias no jurisdiction over that issue where the owner
is not a party of t,.,is litigation".
T'lie Court can take judicial notice that Cannon Sub.
was recorded arrl it~ d different parties entirely.
It follows that if the non-contributors gain nothing
by t'lie vacation, then the respondent City has nothing to
base its claim upon, an1i-ts annexation is in error an:i is
void in this instance.

cm: CID sION
It is for certain that t'lie laws of Utah were in operation during the period of 1897 t'lirough 1911 and th at inasmuc'" as t'"'ere has been no evidence produced t'"at ei t'"er
public or private use was made of the property in question,
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and ti.. ere was no evidence pro ch ced by the respondent City
that public money had ever been expended on

i~proving

tre

plot in question, it is safe to conclude t"'at the soutloern
portion of Pearl Street comes within t"'e provision, "ti-lat
a road not used, or worked for a period of five years
ceases to be a hig'li.way" and that it reverted to t"'e succes 3or 1
of the original dedicator.
1.

The appellant's claim to the disputed land ::t> ould
be upheld.

2.

T'ie respondent is bou..'l'ld by ti..e effects of t"'e 1698
provision relating to 5 years non-ues just t\.ie same
as appellants are entitled to 11-e protection of
t...,e operation of the laws.

3.

T...,e fact that th is case could be broug...,t before
the court violates the spirit of the

·doctrine

of stare decisis.

4.

The only way this case can be fairly before the
Court is on the question of t"'e contributors rights.
Appellants cite t"'e oo nsti tu ti on al nandate w"'ich
appears 1n Article VIII Sec. 22.
"District judges may, at any time, report
defects and omissions in t"'e law to tl-e SupreJ11e
Court, and tlie Supreme Court, on or before
t'lie first day ofDecember of each year, s"'all
report in writing to t"'e Governor any seeming
defect or omission in the law".
Eac"' generation does not have t o re 1 nvent

5.

t"'e wheel.

'l""e conflict between Title 25 P"ig"'ways, Section

1114-1120, Laws of Uta"' 1898, and C"'ap. 6 Real Estate,

LaWS

of Utah 1898, must be resolved in lig"'t of t"'e Constitution
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l

of Utah Art. VI, Sec. 26, #12 w'hi"' pro""ibits t,.,e legislature from enactiq; any private or sped. al laws in the
following cases:

No. 12:

"'Laying out, opening, vacating or altering town
plats, hig'hways,
streets wards alleys, or public
grounds. 11
'
'
6.

Whereas there was no evidence presented to the
Court concerning public need and it was repeated
throug""out respondent 1 s brief t»at t""e adjoining
land "'older would benefit from the

openir~

of

Pearl Street, it becomes clearly evident th at
the City by attacking appellant, is defending the
adjoining land owner and attempting to circumvent
the pr ohibi ti on contained in #16 of the above set
forth section which pro"'ibits granting to an
individual, association or corporation any
privilege, immunity or franc"'ise.
T""e resporrlent City could not be here were it not for
the fact t,.,at the appellant 1 s neighbor to the east annexed
to the City.

Like it or not, t"'ey are both riding the

same horse.
In lig'ht of t"'e facts w"'ioh are admitted by b?t"' sides,
it seems t"'a t the respondent City should submit t» at the
principles of equity and public policy, lact-es, and estoppal
be used

agatnst-t~em.

In closing, appellants ask t"iat the lower Court's
order be reversed, ti.,at a new addition be added to t~e U.C •.L
concerning non-contributors rights, and t"'at appellants
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services

Library Services and
Technology
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so
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can be made
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of the area so as to en'li.ance and increase t"'e use of the
Jordan River Parkway and the other

:a rge open spaces the

City "'as to tlie west.

Respectively Submitted,

JJewi -:Po-a~
Don Layton

Mailed 2 copies of Reply brief this date to Judy Lever,
Assistant City Attorney.

June 8, 1979 •

k ~--(;;:;
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